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Abstract: The goal of this thesis is to assess Vidrala as a potential leveraged buyout target. Market and company overviews were performed to evaluate the 
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Vidrala’s presence in a mature market with stable and predictable cash flows makes for a 
very attractive M&A target
Executive Summary
Company Overview Industry Overview
• Founded in 1965, Vidrala currently has 8 factories spread across 5 countries, 
being a dominant player in the Western European Market and serving 
approximately 1 600 customers
• The management team has created a strong player in the respective 
geographies through several successful M&A transactions
• Vidrala has been showing a stable and predictable cash flow generation and a 
leverageable balance sheet
• Being highly dependent on the respective end 
markets, this industry’s main drivers are population 
growth, urbanization, the sustainability trend and 
the premiumization of the end markets, with the 
latter increasing the penetration rate of glass over 
other packaging options
Investment Rationale
• Following the industry trend and company strengths, M&A 
consolidation creates value by increasing exposure in key 
geographies and diversifying product portfolio
• Using excess cash to develop factories 
in glass net importing countries adds 
more value than deleveraging further
• Leveraging the company’s focus on automation 
and increasing usage of cullet allows to increase 
EBITDA margins of the company
Entry Value Creation (in million €) Exit
• The exit is planned for 2025. Entry multiple, 
acquisition leverage and operating model 
yield the following returns:
• Entry will be priced at 7.5x EBITDA, 
according to the relative valuation. 
Overall, the acquisition of Vidrala and its 
target Zignago Vetro plus banking and 
due diligence fees results in a cost of        
€ 2.67Bn 
• The capital structure is composed by 66% 
of debt and 34% of equity, optimizing 
returns and respecting covenants 
• Management team will represent 10% of 
the institutional investment contributing 




Inst. Investors 2.8x 23.6%
Mang. Team 20.9x 83.7%
• The exit strategies considered most 
suited for the deal are IPO due to deal-
size and Strategic Sale due to potential 






















• Vidrala is a leading producer of glass containers for the
food & beverage industries
• It also provides packaging services such as beverages
filling and logistic activities, which account for less than
10% of revenues
• Sales by product segment in 2019:
• Its strategy is to be the European low-cost producer,
always focused on customers and competitiveness,



















1965 – The company 
was installed in Llodio, 
(Alava – Spain) in 1965
1966 - Creation of 
Vidrierías de Álava S.A. 
Its manufacturing 
activity began in 1966 
with one furnace, two 
machines
1967 – Begins exporting
1977- Beginning of press & 
blow production of light 
bottles makes Vidrala the 
technological leader of 
the national market
1981- Transformation of 
furnaces, generating an 
energy saving of 50%,
maintaining productive 
capacity. Corporate name 
changed to Vidrala S.A.
1985 - Vidrala’s shares were 
launched on the stock 
market
1989 - Crisnova, a 100% 
subsidiary of Vidrala, started 
its activity in Caudete
1998 - Second Crisnova´s
furnace came into 
operation
1995 - Third Aiala’s furnace 
was built up
2001 - Approval of 
the Strategic Plan of 
corporate growth
2003 – Beginning of 
Internationalization 
process: Entry into 
Portuguese market 
with acquisition of 
Ricardo Gallo Vidro de 
Embalagem
2007 – Entry into Belgian 
market through acquisition 
of La Manufacture du Verre
2015 –Entry into UK and 
Ireland markets through 
the acquisition of Encirc 
Limited
2015 –Vidrala becomes 4th
largest European player, 
and offers a complete 
range of services
2017 - Acquisition of a 
new factory in Portugal 
(Santos Barosa)
2019 – Sale of La 
Manufacture du Verre, 
ending the presence in 
the Belgian Market
25,000 tons 130,000 tons 450,000 tons 805,000 tons 950,000 tons 1,600,000 tons 
2005 – Acquisition of a new 
plant in Spain and entry in 
Italian Market through 
acquisition of a factory
1965-1967 1967-1981 1981-1998 1998-2003 2003-2015 2015-2019








Company Overview | Company Profile & History
Sources: Company´s Published Reports
Outreach and sales by region
It currently operates through:
8 factories in 
5 countries, producing 
around 
8 billion containers per year 
Serving 1 600 customers 
and
Retaining 15% of the Western 
European market
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Considering market trends, glass will have an important role in the future of packaging
Glass bottles and containers Market
Global market size (in billion €)
• It is expected to grow at a CAGR of 4.1%
between 2020 and 2025
• Asia pacific is the biggest market , followed by 
Europe, where Germany, France and Russia 
account for a significant part of the revenues
• The market is competitive and increasingly 
concentrated
Main competitors in Western Europe
• The majority of glass packaging consumption is 
made by the alcoholic beverages industry,  with 




































looking for higher 
quality products, 
and do not mind 
paying a premium
Glass allows for 
attractive design 








• Increasing urban population and 
purchasing power
• Growing demand for alcoholic beverages, 
especially for beer
• Growing number of policies to reduce the 
use of plastics
• Increasing wine trade
















Market Overview | Global Glass Bottles and Containers Market
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Net importers of glass in Eastern Europe and North Africa represent the best opportunities 
for a greenfield expansion
Market Overview | Opportunities
Sources: Trade Map, Statista
Trade balance of the countries allow us to deepen our analysis 
regarding which markets to entry, since it shows us where 
demand is larger than what is being produced by the local 
producers
• In Eastern Europe: Romania and Latvia seem to be the 
regions where there is greater room for more producers 
• Regarding North African countries, there seems to be a lot 
of opportunities: Algeria, Morocco and Libya. However, in 
these countries a thorough analysis regarding political and 

















Europe   
Alcoholic drinks 208 530 3 221 57 215 32 728
CAGR  2019-2023 2.5% 6.5% 4.4% 2.3%
Non-Alcoholic drinks 137 137 18 501 19 400 10 440
CAGR 2019-2023 2.5% 11.5% 6.3% 3.3%
Food 639 913 131 212 323 516 81 077
CAGR 2019-2023 1.9% 8% 2.4% 1.7%
Beauty and personal care 58264 9 861 19 000 6 021
CAGR 2019-2023 1.9% 3.1% 2.7% 2%
OTC Pharmaceuticals 101 533 1 249 3 594 1 278
CAGR 2019-2023 3.7% 2% 3.1% 3.1%
End Markets size (in million €) and growth 
* Does not include Portugal, Spain nor Italy
Why Beauty and Personal care?
Mainly driven by consumer spending, the 
market is growing as beauty products 
increasingly make part of daily routines. High 
growth opportunities, especially for prestige 
and luxury products, account for 25% of 
revenues. In UK, Italy and Spain, where Vidrala
already operates, the share of people that buys 
these products is 28%, 22% and 21%, respectively
People are looking for visually appealing, 
sustainable and more natural products, with a 
packaging that allow them to see its quality
Why Pharmaceuticals?
Increasing consciousness about health and 
access to health care are driving the demand 
for pharmaceuticals up, particularly in middle 
income countries where it is growing at a 
faster pace 
Countries where Vidrala currently operates 
have high access to medicine. Glass is one of 
the main packaging solutions for medicine 
and drugs, allowing the products to keep 
their properties and contributing to 
sustainability
















Glass Trade balance in 2019 (USD thousand)
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Financial Analysis | Income Statement
M&A Activity is boosting growth and margins
in Million € 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Revenues 458 474 469 803 774 823 955 1 011
Organic Growth Rate N/A 3.5% (1.0%) 2.3% (3.7%) (3.8%) 16.1% 5.8%
Inorganic Growth Rate N/A 0.0% 0.0% 69.1% 0.0% 10.2% 0.0% 0.0%
COGS (156) (157) (164) (304) (279) (277) (318) (320)
Gross Profit 301 317 304 499 495 546 637 691
Gross Margin (%) 65.8% 66.8% 64.9% 62.2% 64.0% 66.4% 66.7% 68.4%
Employee Expenses (100) (100) (96) (166) (166) (175) (190) (198)
Other Expenses (102) (106) (102) (178) (162) (181) (204) (207)
Other EBITDA 
Adjustments 2 3 1 (3) 5 (1) (2) (25)
Adjusted EBITDA 102 114 107 152 172 190 242 262
EBITDA Margin (%) 22.2% 24.1% 22.8% 18.9% 22.2% 23.1% 25.3% 25.9%
NOPAT 46 58 50 57 75 86 121 135
NOPAT Margin (%) 10.0% 12.2% 10.6% 7.1% 9.6% 10.4% 12.6% 13.4%
in Million € 2018 2019
Revenues 955 1 011
Iberian Peninsula 567 597
UK & Ireland 334 351
Italy 54 63
Rest of European Union – –
in Million € 2018 2019
Other expenses (204) (207)
External Services (46) (45)
Electricity (54) (51)







• Vidrala has been actively participating in M&A by 
acquiring manufacturing sites in strategical locations
• In 2015 Vidrala acquired its UK & Ireland divisions 
which added over € 300M in revenue. Organic growth 
rate was 2.3%
• In 2017 Vidrala completed another acquisition, Santos 
Barosa in Portugal, adding over € 140M in revenue
• In 2019 the Belgium site was sold to Carlyle Group 
Owned, Saverglass
• Vidrala’s strategy focuses on cost optimization and 
product mix diversification
1
• The acquisition of the UK & Ireland divisions hurt 
Vidrala’s margins as these divisions had significantly 
higher costs compared to others. In 2015, UK & 
Ireland had EBITDA margins close to 18% while other 
segments had close to 21%, with the Iberian Peninsula 
being the most profitable at circa 30%. Currently, UK 
has margins closer to 25%
2
• Energy consumption, specifically, electricity and 
natural gas represent one of the largest cost drivers 
as this industry is very energy intensive
• Sales expense refers to storage and transportation 
costs regarding its logistic services, another large 
standalone cost driver
3
• Employee Expenses and External Services (more 
specifically, maintenance and Insurance) are the two 
least variable captions when analysing a fixed vs 
variable cost basis





Sources: Vidrala’s annual reports
Vidrala’s Income statement key captions 2012-2019
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Financial Analysis | Ratio Analysis
Vidrala has the highest ROA among its peers
• The period between 2014 and 2019 shows a declining 
trend in the cash conversion cycle of the firm. The 
component that has contributed more towards this 
trend is the decline in the holding period, meaning 
the firm took less time to sell its inventories. There 
was also an upward trend on the Payable period since 
as the company scales up, it has more bargaining 
power with its suppliers
• Regarding Vidrala´s position compared to its peers, it 
is observed that smaller players like Zignago Vetro and 
Vetropack have the worst cycles
1
• In the last 5 years there was an increase in the Return 
on Assets of the company. This happened due to 
improvements in the efficiency translated in the 
operational margins but also, because of a positive 
trend in the capacity of generating more sales with 
the assets of the company*
• The second graph shows that Vidrala presented in 
2019 the biggest ROA. When looking at the Asset 
turnover, it is seen that the best companies were 
Verallia and Vetropack. However, in the operational 
margin these 2 players are not as good
2
• The Return on Equity also shows an up-warding trend. 
This happened because although there has been a 
deleveraging of the company in the last 3-4 years, the 
increases on Return on Assets more than compensated 
this negative trend in leverage
• Verallia is the player with the lowest return on assets 
and the highest ROE, which is driven by the highest level 
of leverage within its peers
3
*The decline in Asset turnover in 2017 happened due to the 
acquisition of Santos Barosa, since it increased significantly the 
























Vidrala Vetropack Zignago Vetro Verallia
Cash Conversion 
Cycle
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Vidrala Vetropack Zignago Vetro Verallia
Return on Assets Leverage (Net debt/ EBITDA)ROE
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- Vidrala has a leverageable Balance
Sheet with large assets to collateralize
- Vidrala’s strong and predictable cash 
flow generation allow M&A Activity




- Management team has high tenure in 
the company with deep industry 
knowledge
- Focus on operational improvements 
through M&A and it is observable in 
revenue per employee levels
- Two large acquisitions in the past 5 
years with successful integration 
and operational improvement
- Focus on product portfolio 
diversification and margins 
optimization
- General perception of Glass as a safe 
packaging material
- Premiumization of beverages 
increases demand for glass packaging
- Increasing consumer demand for 
environmentally sustainable products
















• Use Vidrala’s high & stable FCF generation and Management 
Team’s experience to acquire targets in strategical geographies 
and diversify product portfolio
• Continue to consolidate the western Europe market position
• Increase of Automation
• Decrease of Sales Expenses
• Increase in usage of recycled glass
• Increase presence and improvement of Vidrala’s division in Italy 
• Increase product portfolio and new end market
Buy-and-Build, Operational improvements and Greenfield development are the  most 
adequate strategies to create value for Vidrala
Greenfield Development
• Building a new plant can 
bring several opportunities 
to grow. Vidrala will be able 
to capture an important 
fraction of the market, 
taking advantage of its 
experience and efficiency to 
outperform current players
• Adrian Curry, Encirc’s
general manager, has 
experience in setting plants 
from scratch and can 
contribute with his expertise
• Savings in energy and COGS will be driven 
by: increase in usage of cullet, increased 
use of renewable sources and possible 
recovery of heat to be re-used in the 
production process (TASIO UE project)
• Continuation of the automation trend, in 
line with company´s investment in R&D, 
in areas such as robotics and big data, 
that until now have translated into the 
highest revenue per employee among 
competitors
Operational Improvements
Investment Thesis | Overview
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Investment Thesis | Buy-and-Build (II/III)
Plan A consists of acquiring Zignago Vetro, due its product portfolio and strong positioning   
in Western Europe
Acquisition plans
Sources: Vidrala, Zignago Vetro, Vetropack, Eurovetro, Google Maps Notes: *Company profile in the appendix
Plan A – Zignago Vetro Plan B – Vetropack Why Zignago over Vetropack? Criteria for Other Targets 
Zignago Vetro is the best acquisition target for 
Vidrala since it checks most criteria the company 
defined in 2015 when acquiring Encirc:
• Customer diversification
• Different Product-Mix weights
• Consolidation of the Western Europe market
• Usage of higher cullet rates due to already 
existent vertical integration
In addition, Zignago Vetro has a more complete 
product portfolio than Vidrala, adding:
• Cosmetics and Perfumery
• Specialty Glass Containers
Zigango’s presence in Italy can also be leveraged 
to improve the overall performance of the 
group’s operations in that country
Zignago’s ownership of joint ventures Vetri
Speciali and Vetreco, 50 and 30% respectively, are 
not considered since these targets are not 
strategically fit
If for any reason the acquisition of 
Zignago Vetro fails a Plan B is 
considered 
Most criteria also check for 
Vetropack however, with less 
influence in the Western Europe 
Market
Vetropack also has a larger 
product portfolio than Vidrala:
• Pharmaceutical Packaging
There are three main reasons 
to choose Zignago over 
Vetropack:
• Core Markets
Zignago Vetro has presence in a 
Western European Market 
where Vidrala is not (France)
• Potential Deal Size
Vetropack has a much larger 
EBITDA than Zignago (€ 170M 
vs € 79M) which would bring 
higher risk to the deal, albeit 
Zignago’s EBITDA is still 
relevant
• Better EBITDA margins
Zignago Vetro has already 
better margins than Vetropack
In case both deals fail it is 
important to define some 
criteria so that the deal 
succeeds:
Tier 1:





• Deal size or combined size 
of the companies acquired 
• Cullet utilization rate
• Speed of the Due 
Diligence Process
Moreover, vertical 
integration can also be 
considered in order to 
increase the cullet utilization 
rates. One example could be 
Eurovetro*, which is only, 20 
minutes away from Vidrala’s 
facilities in Italy
If the acquisition of Vetropack is 
not possible smaller acquisitions 
should be considered according to 
the established criteria
Note that probably these 
companies will not have recycled 
glass providers, and so, in this 
case vertical integration should 
also be considered




Investment Thesis | Operational Improvements
Automation and integration of big data will be the main operational improvements behind
the increase in EBITDA margin
Revenue per employee 
(in €)
• Maintain the path of automation and digitalization of the production 
process with inclusion of robotics and bid data into making the 
production process as efficient as possible
• From 2014 to 2019, the company increased the ratio of revenue per 
employee from € 251.7 to € 268.4. In the upcoming years, the companies' 
investment in R&D will be maintained and push the Vidrala Academy 
towards the goal of achieving a revenue per employee of € 295.7
• This obviously directly impacts the personnel expenses and 
consequently key performance ratios such as the EBITDA margin
• As a member of the FEVE association, Vidrala has committed to increase 
the % of cullet in its production process. This will allow the company to 
decrease the costs associated with electricity and raw materials and to 
increase the capacity of each furnace, since the duration of the melting 
process also decreases with the usage of cullet*
Sources: *Research Gate, Impact of Glass Cullet on the Consumption of Energy and Environment in the Production of Glass Packaging Material
Rate of Cullet Inclusion
• Investments are planned with the goal of increasing efficiency and 
consequently reduce the weight of the raw materials in the cost 
structure of the company. The investments in furnace upgrades promise 
to bring marginal decreases in the % of COGS relative to sales along the 
next years. At the same time, Investments in the UK & Ireland region are 
expected to push this segment of the company closer to the margins of 
the rest of the group and decrease the weight of the COGS to around 
30% of revenues
COGS as % of Revenue
Vidrala Gross Margin Vetropack Gross Margin 
2019
Zignago Vetro Gross 
Margin 2019
The efforts to include of Cullet and furnace upgrades will 
cause an increase on the gross margin of Vidrala, moving 
progressively closer to the gross margins of certain 
competitors/ targets of similar size to Vidrala
Vidrala EBITDA Margin
The continuous investment regarding the integration of 
robotics and big data in the production process will 
continue to increase the revenue per employee and will 







(excluding joint ventures) 
In order to be able to achieve these improvements, Vidrala will have to keep investing in technology. 
This way, beyond the expansion capex, the levels of capex will be 16% higher (the average for the last 
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Investment Thesis | Greenfield Development
Although the industry is going through a consolidation proccess, Romania is suited for a 
greenfield development due to its glass trade balance, market size and growth
Sources: Vidrala Annual Report, Glass International, Eurostat, IMF
The location chosen to build the new plant was
• Romania is a net importer of glass containers
• It is an Eastern European country, giving Vidrala the 
oportunity to benefit from big markets with higher 
growth rates
• Its proximity to several other countries in this region 
that Vidrala may serve as well: Moldavia, Ukraine, 
Bulgaria, Serbia and Hungary
• Lower labor, land and production costs








Gross PP&E per plant- Average of the current GPP&E per furnace was used. 
Although land might be cheaper in Romania, there is great uncertainty about 
other possible investments
Revenue- average revenue per furnace was used and an assumption regarding 
the number of furnaces to build was made according to the demand identified 
by the group according to the size of the market, growth rates and trade balance
Net Working Capital- Worst captions of last 4y of Vidrala were assumed as a 
starting point, with improvements taking place over the years
Employee Expenses- Calculated according to Average Hourly manufacturing 
costs in Romania (Eurostat), evolving according to inflation throughout the 





Construction of the plant will start in 
the beginning of 2021
Years until plant starts producing 
1 year
Production capacity in
1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year
50% 70% 100%
Millions of € 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026
Revenues - 53.2 85.1 109.6 113.0 117.4
Gross Profit - 27.9 50.7 76.1 79.1 82.5
Gross margin - 52.4% 59.5% 69.4% 70.0% 70.3%
EBITDA - 9.2 27.1 48.7 51.0 53.5
EBITDA Margin (%) - 17.3% 31.8% 44.4% 45.1% 45.6%
EBIT - (0,2) 17,6 39,2 41,6 44,1
EBIT Margin (%) - (0.4%) 20.7% 35.8% 38.3% 39.1%
NOPAT - (0.2) 14.8 33.0 34.9 37.0
Δ in Net Working Capital - (13.2) (7.5) (5.7) (0.2) (0.4)
CAPEX (134.6) (9.5) (9.5) (9.5) (9.5) (9.5)
FCF (134.6) (13.4) 7.3 27.2 34.7 36.6
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Organic Growth
The acquisition of Zignago Vetro will give exposure to other geographies and end markets
Business Plan | Financials Forecast : Revenue– PLAN A
Sources: IMF, Passport, World Bank
in Million € 2018H 2019H 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F 2026F 2027F 2028F CAGR
Iberian Peninsula 567 597 583 609 632 652 669 682 697 712 727 3.2%
UK & Ireland 334 351 344 362 376 388 398 408 416 425 433 3.5%
Italy 54 63 61 64 67 68 70 71 72 74 75 3.1%
Greenfield Expansion – – – – 53 85 110 113 117 122 127 28.6%
Zignago Vetro – – – – 332 342 350 357 364 371 378 2.5%
Total Revenue 955 1 011 988 1 035 1 460 1 536 1 597 1 632 1 667 1 703 1 741 10.6%
% Growth 5.8% (2.3%) 4.7% 41.1% 5.2% 4.0% 2.2% 2.2% 2.2% 2.2%




The CAGR for total revenue is forecasted to be 10.6%. This percentage is however influenced 
by the acquisition of Zignago Vetro. The organic growth CAGR on the revenues is estimated 
at 3.3%, following the growth rates of the overall glass container packaging market. Although 
the market is projected to incur in a 2.3% decline in 2020 due to Covid-19, it bounces back in the 
following years, returning to similar growth rates as the ones presented before the pandemic
GDP growth (%) Urban Population (Millions)
The Price forecast was based on historical relationship identified between the evolution 
of prices in end-markets and the evolution of prices in glass containers. The premiumization 
trend identified in the market analysis was also considered
The Volume forecast for glass containers were calculated considering glass usage 
trends and with an optimization method of 2 coefficients which were multiplied by: 







The jump in total revenue verified in 2022, occurs due to the 
integration of Zignago Vetro in the group. This uplift in 
revenues consolidates Vidrala as one of the biggest players in 
the European glass container industry. It also allows Vidrala to 
gain exposure to a new end market: cosmetics and personal 
care. Additionally, the company will consolidate its position in 
Italy, enter the Polish market and benefit from the sales 
division of Zignago Vetro in the US to increase the number of 






2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F
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Organic EBITDA is expected to grow at a 6.9% CAGR, 
while with the Add-ons contributions is expected to 
grow at a 16.4% CAGR
Add-ons EBITDA is expected to account for roughly 58%
(€ 144M out of € 247M) of the EBITDA growth from 2020 
to 2025
Business Plan | Financials Forecast : EBITDA – PLAN A
Consolidated EBITDA margins are expected grow by 4.6pp by 2025
in Million € 2018H 2019H 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F 2026F 2027F 2028F CAGR*
Gross Profit 652 703 680 718 1,053 1,115 1,174 1,208 1,238 1,270 1,301 12.2%
Vidrala 652 703 680 718 752 783 811 836 857 879 901 4.2%
Add-ons – – – – 300 332 363 372 381 391 400 7.4%
Employee Benefit (191) (198) (199) (207) (300) (305) (309) (314) (319) (324) (330) 9.5%
Vidrala (191) (198) (199) (207) (212) (216) (220) (224) (228) (233) (238) 2.4%
Add-ons – – – – (88) (89) (89) (90) (90) (91) (92) 0.8%
Other Expenses (222) (231) (222) (231) (355) (369) (375) (383) (390) (396) (403) 11.5%
Vidrala (222) (231) (222) (231) (233) (240) (239) (244) (249) (251) (256) 1.9%
Add-ons – – – – (122) (130) (136) (139) (142) (145) (148) 4.5%
Organic EBITDA 239 275 264 280 307 327 352 368 380 395 407 6.9%
Add-ons EBITDA – – – – 91 113 138 144 149 155 161 16.4%
Total EBITDA 239 275 264 280 398 440 490 511 529 550 568 14.2%














Other expenses are mainly composed by sales
expenses, electricity and external services (rents, 
insurance, etc.). There are synergies regarding sales 
expenses with Zignago Vetro. These synergies are 
obtained due to assumed improvements in logistics 
and transportation costs (since geographies of both 
players overlap)
Notes: Add-ons are composed by Zignago and the Greenfield Investment.*From 2020 (2022 Add-ons) to 2025
At exit, the EBITDA margin of the whole group is 
estimated to be 31.3%
However, due to the operating model assumptions, 
this value is expected to increase until 32.6% in 2028
From 2020 to 2025 EBITDA almost doubles 
Organic EBITDA is expected to grow at a 6.9% rate. At 
exit this value is expected to be €368M
It is predicted an increase in gross profit that has a 
significant overall impact in total EBITDA growth in 
the investment period 
Electricity/sales cost decreases due to Vidrala’s 
targets of cullet; however, such decrease is not 
particularly relevant given the researched 
information. (always above 5% of sales – for Vidrala’s 
original facilities)
The largest caption in the Employee Benefit expense is 
the Salary and Wages. All captions depend on the 
number of employees and a defined value per 
employee. Regarding the number of employees, the 
driver is the revenue per employee, expected to keep 
increasing. This is because there is an expectancy that 
Vidrala’s technological improvements increase 
automation. For Zignago, due to synergies with Vidrala, 
revenue per employee is expected to increase at a 3.5% 
yoy rate. However, in 2025 it is modelled to be about 
45% of the number of Vidrala. The cost per employee 
increases at expected inflation. Gross Margin for the 
whole company is expected to increase from 68.8% to 






Business Plan | Financials Forecast : Free Cash Flow – PLAN A
With EBITDA growth, decreasing changes in NWC and  
constant levels of CAPEX, the FCF grows at a CAGR of 17.8%
in Million € 2018H 2019H 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F 2026F 2027F 2028F CAGR
Total EBITDA 239 275 264 280 398 440 490 511 529 550 568 14.2%
Amortization & 
depreciation (88) (91) (90) (92) (151) (152) (154) (155) (156) (157) (158) 11.5%
Vidrala (88) (91) (90) (92) (94) (95) (96) (97) (98) (99) (100) 1.5%
Add-ons – – – – (58) (58) (58) (58) (58) (58) (58) 0.0%
Impairments (4) (6) – – – – – – – – –
EBIT 147 178 174 188 246 288 336 357 374 393 410 15.5%
EBIT Margin (%) 15.4% 17.6% 17.6% 18.2% 16.9% 18.7% 21.1% 21.9% 22.4% 23.1% 23.6% 4.4%
Income tax (Adj.) (32) (39) (40) (43) (57) (66) (77) (82) (86) (90) (94) 15.5%
Changes in NWC (28) (17) 8 (9) (23) (11) (8) (1) (1) (1) (1)
OCF 180 219 231 227 318 363 405 428 442 458 472 13.1%
CAPEX (102) (107) (118) (255) (167) (168) (169) (170) (172) (173) (174) 7.6%
Free Cash Flow 
(excl.acquisitions &cash) 78 112 113 (27) 152 195 236 258 271 285 298 17.8%
Free Cash Flow
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2019H 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F
NPP&E and CAPEX 
(in million €)
Vidrala NPP&E Zignago NPP&E CAPEX Vidrala Capex Zignago
Depreciation is assumed to be kept constant as a 
percentage of Gross Property Plant and Equipment 
(except work in progress). In 2022, it increases steeply 
after starting the greenfield development and 
Zingano's acquisition takes place
1
Impairments are a non-recurring expense and thus 
assumed to be zero in the future
2
Considering Spain’s tax rate of 25%, Vidrala’s effective 
tax rate of 21.7% in 2019, and the fact that other 
countries where Vidrala will operate have lower 
corporate tax rates, the chosen tax rate was 23%
3
As a result of COVID-19, NWC decreases by 3.8% in 2020 
and increases sharply in 2022 due to the acquisition of 
Zignago and the operations in Romania. However, for 
the remaining years it increases at a lower rate. This is 
mainly explained by lower days in inventories (a 
reduction of 1.7% per year) achieved through synergies, 
automation and improving management systems
4
The graph on the right, shows the composition of 
NPP&E and CAPEX excluding the investment in the 
acquisition. Expansion capex is used in 2020 and 2021 to 
invest in 2 new furnaces in Ireland’s facilities (€ 28M 
per year) and to build the new plant in Romania            
(€ 135M). Between 2022 and 2028 there is just 
maintenance capex, including the investment made to 




318 329 337 338 339
2019H 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F 2026F
Net Working Capital evolution
(in million €)
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• Main source of EBITDA Margin expansion 
comes from COGS as acquiring companies 
who use more recycled glass allow for lower 
COGS and accelerate the glass production 
process
• By using a higher share of recycled glass in 
the manufacturing process, Vidrala reduces 
Electricity costs as glass takes less time in 
the furnaces to be complete
• Finally, by introducing Vidrala’s significantly 
more automated process to its target, it 
allows to reduce Employee Expenses in the 
acquired targets
Margin Uplift
• Maintenance CAPEX is expected to remain 
at historical levels, with a slight increase for 
Vidrala’s current schedule
Capex
Business Plan | Growth Forecasts Overview
The Business Plan forecasts an additional € 621M in Revenue and € 247M in EBITDA 
Top Line Bottom Line Expansion
• GDP Growth and share of Urban population 
are the main growth drivers
• Premiumization of alcoholic beverages 
increase demand for glass
Organic Growth
• Acquire an additional € 332M in 2022 in 
Europe to expand presence in Italian market 
and add exposure to the Pharmaceutical & 
Cosmetics end markets as well as other 
European Countries
• Leverage targets’ connections with cullet 
providers to increase share of recycled glass
Inorganic Growth • Investment in Net Working Capital is 
expected to follow the historical correlation 
with company growth
• Furthermore, inventory synergies are 
expected to be introduced by increasing the 
business scale. Using a conservative 
forecast of a 2.5% yoy improvement, CCC is 















2018H 2020F 2022F 2024F 2026F 2028F
Capex (excl. M&A)





















Acquisition of Zignago Vetro is the main driving force for the increase in EBITDA
Business Plan | Financials Forecast : EBITDA bridge – Plan A
Vidrala’s Ebitda Organic Growth Acquisitions Exit EBITDAEntry EBITDA
• The greenfield development is expected to be working at full capacity by 
2025 and to contribute with an EBITDA of around € 51M. Assuming the 
project goes according to projections, it accounts for around 21% of the 
difference in EBITDA between 202o and 2025
• The acquisition of Zignago Vetro is the the main driver of EBITDA growth. 
Not only does the company contribute with an EBITDA of € 92.6M by 2025 
but it also adds an extra value of € 14.1M since it causes an uplift of 
Vidrala´s existing facilities in Italy, and reduction in sales expenses due to 
overlapping services
From 2020 to 2025, EBITDA grows at a CAGR of 14.1% reaching € 511.2 M. The EBITDA margin improves 4.6 percentage points from 26.7% in 2020 to 31.3% in 2025. 
Regarding absolute values, the exit EBITDA in 2025 is 1.94x the EBITDA of 2020. The main drivers of the expected increase are the acquisition of Zignago Vetro, while 
other determinants were almost equally important
• The € 46.3M increase in EBITDA that comes from market growth is very 
significant. With rising consumption trends towards the use of glass, 
Vidrala’s current markets are expected to grow at a CAGR of 3% between 
2020 and 2025, contributing for almost 20% of the EBITDA difference
• Operational improvements also play an important role (€ 43.7M). The focus 
will be continuing to leverage Vidrala’s high level of automation, as 
expenses with personnel are one of the main costs, and betting on the use 
of more cullet to reduce energy and material consumption by a 2% minimum
Greenfield
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4.5x 5.5x 6.5x 7.5x 8.5x 9.5x 10.5x
Combining several valuation methodologies resulted in a multiple of 7.5x, which correspond 
to an enterprise value of € 2Bn for Vidrala
Valuation | Entry Valuation





















This method includes 
information from 8 
past transactions from 
the last 6 years, which 
were considered 
relevant for our 
valuation. However, it 
is important to stress 
that some deals’ sizes 
were smaller than the 
current one
EV/EBITDA Cycle 
This method was 
used in order to 
understand how 
the multiple has 
been evolving over 
time. For this 
purpose, the next 
twelve months 
EV/EBITDA 
multiples from the 
last 10 years were 
retrieved
LBO Valuation
The LBO method reflects 
the entry multiple that 
by considering the exit 
proceeds allows the 
fund to obtain the 
target return (20%-30%)
EV/EBITDA
Current next twelve months EV/EBITDA helps 
measuring the enterprise value of peers in 
relative terms. It does not take into 
consideration the capital structure, reflecting 
mainly the operational performance. Vidrala 
and Zignago Vetro’s multiples are way above 
the average of 7.9x (10.2x and 11.2x 
respectively). While these companies may be 
more competitive and should have an above 
the average entry multiple, it does not seem 
reasonable to assume their current trading 
multiples to enter in the project 
2nd Quartile to 
Median
Median to 3rd 
Quartile
DCF Model
For the DCF model valuation, it is 
considered Vidrala’s predicted 
free cash flows without 
synergies, a WACC of 6.5%
(Bloomberg Estimate) and a 
perpetual growth rate of 0.5%, 
which are then used for sensitivity
Share Price
The share price analysis is a 
reality check for the entry 
multiple as it reflects the 
company’s market value. To 
perform this valuation, data 










Sources: Bloomberg, Eikon Reuters
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Past Transactions and trading EV/ EBITDA multiples of comparable companies indicate 
Vidrala´s current trading multiple could be inflated





2015 2018 2015 2015 2014 2017 2014 2017
Average









FY-9 FY-8 FY-7 FY-6 FY-5 FY-4 FY-3 FY-2 FY-1 FY0
Vidrala SA Vetropack Holding SA
Zignago Vetro SpA O-I Glass Inc
Median Average Thorughout 10y
Year Target Name Acquirer Name
EV 
(in million €) EV/EBITDA
2018 Santos Barosa Vidrala 252.7 7.7x
2017 Drujba Glassworks AD BA Vidro SA 187.9 5.2x
2017 Anchor Glass BA Glass, CVC 1 040 7.3x
2015 Encirc Vidrala 408.6 6.8x
2015 Centor US Gerresheimer 725 9.8x
2015 Verallia Apollo Global Management 2 950 7.4x
2014 Verallia North America Ardagh Group 1 220 6.5x
2014 Anchor Glass KPS 435 4.8x
• Past M&A transactions were selected based on information available in 
Bloomberg, Reuters and other public sources. Due to the limited information 
of transactions for this specific industry (regarding EV, EBITDA values) and 
the criteria regarding geographic markets, deal size and years to the 
present, for the last 5 years only 8 transactions were taken into 
consideration
• The average multiple of these transactions was 6.9x EBITDA. Outlined below 
with a grey colour are also 3 specific transactions since they are closer to the 
deal sizes considered for the LBO
• The graph presented above shows that Glass Container Industry has been 
presenting an increase in the EV/ EBITDA multiple over the last 10 years. 
However, when compared to the yearly median, the average of the last 10 
and the average of the last 3 years, the multiples of Vidrala and Zignago Vetro
are much higher
• For this reason and as previously mentioned, the multiples used as an Input 
for the LBO model were below the current trading multiples of both 
companies. There are 2 main reasons behind this rationale:
• The first is the fact that all selected comparable firms operate in the 
same industry, with a similar geographical market, product portfolio 
and operating margins
• The second, is the fact that with the current trading multiples it would 
be significantly more difficult to obtain returns close to the ones that 









Capital Structure | Credit Rating
Changes
Industry cyclicality Unchanged Intermediate
Country risk Entry in Eastern Europe Low
Competitive risk Unchanged Low
Leverage Significant amount of debt used High
Net Debt/Ebitda 6.9x
Apollo’s acquisition of Verallia is a good “reality check” for the Capital Structure
used in the LBO model
Sources: Thomson Reuters, Eikon Reuters, Standard & Poor’s
Debt Market Analysis - Past Acquisitions of Verallia
Acquires
• Although there is no agency's rating for Vidrala, an estimation was made based on  
Standard & Poor’s credit rating criteria, current information available for peers and implied 
rating of A from Eikon's Model
Credit Rating for Vidrala
As a point of reference, it is useful to look at Apollo Global 
Management’s acquisition of Verallia, a glass container company 
operating in Europe and South America. 
The debt structure and multiples were considered as benchmark 
for Vidrala’s LBO as can be seen in the following tables
Current Combined Credit 
Risk Eikon Reuters 
Model
Model summary
In Developed Europe 92
Probability of Default 0,05%
Structural Model 88
Text Mining Model 94
SmartRatios Model 77




Industry cyclicality Intermediate       



























Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, BNP Paribas, 
JP Morgan, Nomura, Société General, UBS
Debt Structure Value EBITDA x % of Total
Total Debt € 2.2B 5.5x 75%
Senior Debt € 1.7B 4.1x 56.9%
Sub. high yield 
bonds
€ 370M 0.9x 12%






Capital Structure | Sources and Uses (I/II)
Entry debt is assumed to account for 66% of the capital 
structure, representing 5.12x the EBITDA for the both firms
1
3
Uses of FundsSources of Funds








Total EV 2 585.6 96.64%






FRI 692.7 2.63x 25.9%
Ordinary Equity 63.2 0.2x 2.4%





FRI 161.9 2.04x 6.1%
Total Equity 917.8 34.3%
TOTAL SOURCES 2 672.4 7.79x 100%






Senior debt 1 054.3 5x 39.5%




Senior debt 436.7 5.5x 16.3%
Total debt 1 754.6 65.7%
Fees In million € % of Total Uses
DD Fees 25.9 1.0%
Advisory Fees 25.9 1.0%
Banking Fees 35.0 1.36%
Total Fees 86.8 3.36%
TOTAL USES 2 672.4 100%
2
4
Notes: A more detailed version of Sources in Uses is available in Slide 35 (Additional Considerations)
Taking into consideration the capex requirements for 
the project and the future cash flow generation, the 
capital structure is expected to be composed by 65.7% 
of debt and 34.3% of equity (5.12x the Sum of EBITDA 
of Vidrala and Zignago). These figures show lower 
leverage when compared with deal of Apollo which 
took place in 2015
2
Vidrala is assumed to be acquired for € 1.99Bn at the 
end of 2020 and Zignago Vetro one year later for                
€ 598.6M, with the same entry multiple of 7.5x. Adding 
3.36% in fees, it results in a total investment of 
€ 2.67Bn
1
The Management Team receives ownership of 10% of 
the Ordinary Shares. For that, they pay 2x their fixed 
component of the annual salary at entry (to 
guarantee they have “skin in the game”). The 
Institutional Investors figure is computed maintaining 
the price paid per % of ownership equal to the 
management team. The Fixed Return Instrument 
accounts for the rest of the equity and has a hurdle 
rate of 10%. The second capital call is done through an 
FRI in order not to dilute the Management Team
4
Considering the entry levels of each company 
separately: Vidrala is acquired with 63.6% of Debt and 
36.4% of Equity, while Zignago Vetro is acquired with 




• Term loan A has a maturity of 6 years, interest rate of 
3.12% and is amortised until its expiration
• Term Loan B has a bullet payment in 7 years and an 
interest rate of 3.73%
• Term Loan C is also a bullet loan, with 8 years maturity 
and pays 4.32% of interest
• Term loan D has a maturity of 6 years and an interest 
rate of 3.12% and is amortised until its expiration
• Term Loan E has a bullet payment in 7 years and an 
interest rate of 3.73%
Subordinated debt
• Mezzanine represents 10.6% of the funding and has a PIK 
element of 6% and a cash element of 5.72%
• There is also a capex facility, drawn in 2021, which helps to fund 
€ 97.3M of the expansion capex associated mainly to the 
Greenfield – funding 60% of that capex expense 
In Million € Amount Type Maturity Interest % of Total uses
Debt
Senior debt
Term Loan A 263.6 Amortised 6 3.12% 9.9%
Term Loan B 527.1 Bullet 7 3.73% 19.7%
Term Loan C 263.6 Bullet 8 4.32% 9.9%
Term Loan D 158.8 Amortised 6 3.12% 5.9%
Term Loan E 277.9 Bullet 7 3.73% 10.4%
Subordinated debt
Mezzanine 263.6 Bullet 9 5.72% (PIK 6%) 9.9%
Total Debt 1 754.6 65.7%
CAPEX Facility 97.6
Total Equity 917.7 34.3%
The chosen debt structure allows to optimize returns and respect covenants with some 
headroom
Capital Structure | Sources and Uses (II/II)
Capital Structure Debt Structure
Interest Rates 
The interest rates used correspond to the yields of corporate bonds with a BB rating, depending on maturity. This rating was decided based on Eikon Reuters credit 
model for Vidrala’s current capital structure, current information available for peers and an estimation based on Standard & Poor’s credit rating criteria 
Sources: Eikon Reuters
22
Capital Structure | Sustainability of debt
Debt outstanding and payments (in million €) Credit Statistics





• This graph shows that every year, the CFs generated from the
operating model are sufficient to comply with Debt Service.
Note that in the Interest payments, it is not included the PIK
component, since it is a non-cash expense
• Debt repayments are modeled to increase throughout the
years with a significant debt repayment in 2027, however, 2
years after expected exit
• Cash Available for debt service presented includes drawdown
and repayment of the capex facility
Cash cover is always 
above its covenant of 
1x. In all the featured 
years there is a 
considerable amount 
of headroom until the 
covenant is breached
With a minimum 
interest cover ratio of 
5.1x, Vidrala’s EBITDA 
will be more than able 
to pay the interest 
expenses between 
2021 and 2026
The gap between the 
leverage covenant and 
estimated Net 
Debt/EBITDA increases 
over time as debt is 
repaid and EBITDA 
increases
1.32x
1.58x 1.54x 1.55x 1.48x 1.71x
1x
2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F 2026F









2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F 2026F







4.0x 3.4x 3.0x 3.0x
2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F 2026F



















2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F 2026F
Cash available for debt Service Total cash Interest
Debt Repayment Net Debt
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In million € No Recapitalization Leverage Aggressive Base Case
Debt
Senior debt
Term Loan A 263.6 316.3 263.6
Term Loan B 527.1 474.4 527.2
Term Loan C 263.6 395.4 263.6
Term Loan D - 158.8 158.8
Term Loan E - 317.6 277.9
Subordinated debt
Mezzanine 263.6 263.6 263.6
Total Debt 1 317.8 1 926.1 1 754.6
CAPEX Facility 456.8 97.6 97.6






• The capital structure allows to reach higher returns. However, in this case headroom 
is lower, increasing the risk of default. Debt structure is similar to the Base Case but 
has a greater weight, accounting for 72% of the overall structure
No Recapitalization
• In the scenario with no recapitalization, the capex facility “takes the role” of Term 
Loans D and E in funding Zignago´s Acquisition. However, due to the size of the 
company, the level of Excess of Cash in the BS and CF of 2021 , it would not be 
enough to fund the rest of acquisition (cash cover breached). This is the reason 
why recapitalization is the best solution for operating model
The chosen capital structure allows to optimize returns and respect covenants with some 
headroom
Capital Structure Scenarios Capital Structure Scenarios
Covenats 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F 2026F
Cash Cover - 0.90x 1.10x 1.19x 1.38x 2.45x
Cash covenant 1.0x 1.0x 1.0x 1.0x 1.0x 1.0x
Interest Cover 5.1x 7.3x 7.9x 8.9x 9.4x 9.9x
Interest covenant 3.7x 4.9x 5.7x 6.8x 7.8x 7.8x
Net Debt/ EBITDA 6.7x 4.4x 3.7x 2.9x 2.4x 1.9x
Leverage covenant 4.7x 3.5x 2.9x 2.4x 2.0x 2.0x
Covenants 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F 2026F
Cash Cover 1.12x 1.38x 1.34x 1.34x 1.30x 1.51x
Cash covenant 1.0x 1.0x 1.0x 1.0x 1.0x 1.0x
Interest Cover 4.3x 4.8x 5.3x 6.0x 6.4x 6.8x
Interest covenant 4.0x 4.1x 4.6x 5.1x 5.5x 5.5x
Net Debt/ EBITDA 7.2x 4.9x 4.1x 3.4x 2.9x 2.4x
Leverage covenant 7.4x 5.6x 4.9x 4.2x 3.8x 3.8x
Capital Structure | Capital Structure Scenarios
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Assuming an Exit in 2025, the Institutional Investors are expected to obtain a money   
multiple of 2.8x and an IRR of 23.6%
Returns | Exit Waterfall
Entry Proceeds Recap. Exit Proceeds
Inst. Investors
Fixed Return Instrument € 693M € 162M € 1 353M
Inst. Investor Shares € 57M € 1 189M
Returns Management
Sweet Equity € 6M € 132M
• After an Investment period of 5 years, the Exit is planned for 2025. At this point the sum of the EV and Cash adds up to € 3.9Bn
• At Exit, fees were considered lower in percentage of the Total deal since there are lower due diligence requirements, banking and advisory fees. The total amount of 
Debt which is still left to amortize from both Debt calls is close to € 1.1Bn, and there is still a total of approximately € 2.7Bn left to be distributed to the Fund and the 











7.0x   
2.19x   2.54x   2.88x   
7.5x   
2.43x   2.79x   3.14x   
8.0x











7.0x    22.7% 21.3% 19.9%
7.5x   26.0% 23.6% 21.7%
8.0x 29.1% 25.8% 23.3%
Institutional and Management Returns
Exit Waterfall (in million €)
• Management Team: The management team pays a total of € 6.3M for 10% of 
the Ordinary shares. After 5 years they are expected to receive € 132M. The 
payoff to the management team is expected to yield an IRR of 83.27% and a 
money multiple of 20.9x. The 2nd capital call to acquire Zignago (€ 162M) is 
done with a Fixed Return Instrument to avoid dilution Management team
• Institutional Investors: The institutional investors enter the deal with a total of     
€ 911M, divided into FRI ( € 855M ) and Ordinary Shares ( € 57M). At exit, the 
institutional investors are expected to get a total of € 2.5Bn, yielding a MM of 2.8x 
and an IRR of 23.6%
132
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• Both Vidrala and the main 
acquisition targets are already 
Publicly traded
• Deal size won’t cause any strain in 
taking company public
• Higher degree of uncertainty of 
returns due to being dependent on 
market conditions
• Follows trend of industry 
consolidation
• Interesting target due to high 
degree of automation from Vidrala
• Evidence of cross-continent M&A 
activity in this sector (CVC with BA 
Glass)
• Private Equity activity with highest 
dry-powder level in history ($2.5Tn)
• Attractive target with stable cash 
flows and recent greenfield 
development at exit
• Ability to partner with strategic 
buyer
• Potential due to competitive 
concentration in western Europe
• Clients may wish to vertically 
integrate some factories
• Possible red flag from competition 
authorities due to excessive 
industry concentration
• Higher difficulty to find buyers 
when compared with IPO 
• Deal size excludes many buyers, 
creating a large necessity for a club 
deal
• Negotiations can lower the 
possibility of returns derived from 
multiple arbitrage
• Loss of Synergies already present 
and obtained from acquisitions 
• Difficulty/work needed to find a 
buyer for each part 
Notes: Heineken included since in a company report is mentioned to be a client both in Great Britain and in Continental Europe 
26
Individual Reflection 
• During the screening process, several companies were considered to conduct the leveraged 
buyout. Due to its strong and predictable cash-flows, the high level of fixed assets to use as 
collateral of debt and the healthy revenue growth rates we decided to proceed our Work 
Project with Vidrala. During our analysis of the company, the operational efficiency and the 
M&A track record of the Management team showed us once again that this was a good 
target to proceed our project
• Vidrala is inserted in the Glass Container industry which, in the last years has been going 
through a consolidation process. Players such as Vetropack, BA Glass or even Vidrala have 
been acquiring smaller players in both Eastern and Western Europe. The result is that 
nowadays 5-6 companies dominate almost 80% of the European market.
• There also other very interesting trends happening in the glass container industry. On one 
hand, stakeholders in this industry are aware that one of the biggest ecological advantages 
of glass is that it is endlessly recyclable/reutilized. In this context, almost all players in the 
glass packaging industry created/joined FEVE* with the purpose of: achieving a collection 
rate of used glass packaging of 90% by 2030, increasing the % of cullet integrated in the 
production process of all producers- closing the loop of between consumption, production 
and recycling. On the other hand, the industry has recognized that from a sustainable point 
of view, its biggest setback is that the production process is energy intense and so it is 
looking for cleaner sources of energy (“Furnace of the Future” using up to 80% green 
electricity) and creating heat recovery processes to reduce its carbon footprint (ex: TASIO 
project by Vidrala)
• On top of this, and as a consequence of the consolidation process, big players such as 
Vidrala have embraced the new trends in manufacturing and are making big investments in 
order to incorporate big data, machine learning, and artificial intelligence in its production 
processes aiming to be the most efficient player in the market
Glass Packaging Industry Private Equity Outlook 
*FEVE- Federation of European manufacturers of glass containers for food and beverage and flacons for perfumery, cosmetics and pharmacy markets
• Regarding the Private Equity industry, it has shown in recent years that 
the glass container industry is suited for leveraged buyouts. In 2015, 
Apollo Global Management bought Verallia, a French producer, and in 
2016 CVC bought Anchor Glass Container Corporation in partnership 
with BA Glass. The consolidation trend explains partly why PE funds are 
showing interest in some of these players. Private equity funds not only 
bring capital, but they also bring know-how (both on financial and 
industry level) and connections which are an essential part of success in 
M&A transactions and integration processes
• Regarding COVID and its impact in the PE industry, it is safe to say that 
investment in new companies is likely to slow on the sort-term horizon 
overall. However, that might also vary depending on the region of the 
planet- for example, some Asian countries such as China which were 
the first in and out of the pandemic, might be able to recover faster 
than regions such as Europe which is still suffering a lot as a 
consequence of the virus. In this region, the focus instead of being in 
new investments is likely to be in stabilizing the current portfolio of 
companies, and adapting the business strategy to the current adverse 
scenario that the world is facing
• As a result of all the uncertainty created by the pandemic it is 
expectable that the levels of dry powder will continue high and in line 
with what was observed in 2020 









Additional Considerations | Business Plan | Market volume growth assumptions
Sources: IMF, Passport, World Bank
• In order to understand the trends regarding the market 
volumes where Vidrala is, or is planning to be, the data 
regarding real GDP, urban population and units of glass 
containers sold (for food, beverages, beauty & personal 
care) was gathered for 19 countries*
• Containers data was retrieved from Passport for the 
years 2014 to 2019
• Real GDP is used so that there is no influence of the price 
level in the volume predictions
• Note that, at this point, it is not believed that there will 
be any major change in beverages market. Therefore, it is 
highly speculative to guess any major changes in the 
market share of each company
• Another driver is changing in consumer trends, however, 
data for this value is not available and proxies are not 
clear 
* Countries: Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, Ukraine and UK
• Total volume in these segments from 2014 to 2019 grew 
at a 0.81% CAGR, while according to the model, the 
market will grow at a 1.28% CAGR
• IMF predictions about the GDP growth indicate a sharp 
decrease in 2020 output followed by a recovery
• Urban population is expected to increase in most 
countries
• The main intention of these calculations is to obtain an estimate of the market growth for the 
following years
• By using the annual percentual change in these variables (real GDP, urban population and glass 
containers) the goal was to obtain a coefficient, such that, glass containers volume was 
explained by the change in real GDP and urban population:
• Δ (glass containers volume) p.p. = Δ (real gdp) p.p. * c1 + Δ (urban pop.) p.p * c2
• In order to reach these coefficients, the Solver function was used with the goal of minimizing 
the average of the absolute difference between the estimated growth and the growth the 
occurred between 2014 and 2019. The Solver function in Excel was used with following 
constraints:
• C1 >= 0.2
• C2 >= 0.1
• Average of each countries’ individual yearly error between observed and modeled 
below 3%
• Each countries’ individual yearly error below 7%
• In the end, only 2 constraints are binding: 2015 values for Romania and Ireland
• To get the yearly market growth, the expected growth in the GDP and Urban Population 
variables are multiplied by the obtained coefficients and an increase of 0.5 pp to consider eco-
friendly trends in the packaging industry
• Those coefficients are assumed to remain constant during the estimation period and to be 
equal among countries
• Note that due to lack of availability of past data, other methodologies, such as OLS, would have 
one the one hand, high variances and, on the other hand, there would be omitted variable 
biases especially due to the missing of consumer tastes variables
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Glass packaging industry is expected to capture half of the relative increase in end-market 
prices
Data Methodology
Additional Considerations | Business Plan | Price growth assumptions
Sources: Statista, Marketline, IMF 
• Four main data groups are used in order to get estimates 
for price changes: First, data regarding price evolution of 
end-markets and glass packaging market values . 
Second, Vidrala’s target´s product mixes were collected. 
For Vidrala there is also a country mix estimate based on 
GDP
• In order to understand the trends regarding the market 
prices Vidrala is, or is planning to be, the data regarding 
end market price changes and market value of glass 
packaging market was gathered for 15 countries: Austria, 
Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Spain, Switzerland and the UK
• Product mix considered the following categories of 
products: Beer, Spirits, Wine, Cider, Non-Alcoholic 
Beverages, Food, Beauty & Personal Care and Over the 
Counter Pharmaceuticals
• Another driver identified for prices is the trend of 
premiumization, i.e., more expensive products and/or 
more expensive packaging. However, for this there is no 
specific data nor available proxies 
• The main intention of these calculations is to obtain an estimate of the price growth for the 
following years
• The first step in forecasting the price growth was collecting the forecasted prices of the end 
markets in which the company is present or is expected to be present. Since the forecast of 
the end-markets collected from Statista were only until 2025, from those years on an average 
of 3 years before the COVID pandemic was assumed
• After this, an assumption was made regarding the product mix of both Vidrala and the target 
companies- Zignago Vetro and Vetropack. The product mixes were assumed to be similar to
the historical information that was available for each of the companies
• After this we analyzed the historical end-market price evolution vs the glass container 
evolution. Since there seemed to be an established relationship between the 2 components, 
an average was computed of 5y to the past and assumed for the future
The initial product mix is assumed constant. 
From 2022, a 5% of Beauty and personal care 
is included and kept constant in the Iberian 
Peninsula and UK and Ireland and increases 
throughout the years in Italy. Greenfield 
includes the beauty and personal care and 
pharmaceuticals segments
It is made a weighted average using the Real 
GDP of each country for the Iberian 
Peninsula and UK and Ireland
Beauty and personal care 
weight is determined by the 
revenue with luxury 
frangances' containers and 
the rest of the product mix 
is assumed to have a similar 
composition to Vidrala
Italy is 60% according to 
revenue breakdown. The 
rest is split between Poland 
(20%) and France (20%)
The mix is 






The mix was 
made according 

















Vidrala Zignago Vetro Vetropack
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Organic Growth
The acquisition of Vetropack will allow exposure to other geographies and end-markets
Additional Considerations | Business Plan | Financials Forecast : Revenue– PLAN B
Sources: IMF, Passport, World Bank Notes: *1) CAGR from 2020-2025, except for the line of expansion plan (2022-2025); **2) Full methodology in Appendix 28 & 29.






The jump in total revenue verified in 2022, occurs due to the 
integration of Vetropack in the Vidrala group. The 
acquisition allows Vidrala to gain exposure to a new end 
market: cosmetical and personal care. Finally, this 
acquisition allows Vidrala to gain exposure to wide range of 
geographical markets where it still doesn´t operate-
specifically in Eastern Europe - and that have shown some of 
the most interesting growth rates in Europe 
in Million € 2018H 2019H 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F 2026F 2027F 2028F Cagr
Iberian Peninsula 567 597 583 609 632 652 669 682 697 712 727 3.2%
UK & Ireland 334 351 344 362 376 388 398 408 416 425 433 3.5%
Italy 54 63 61 64 67 68 70 71 72 74 75 3.1%
Greenfield Expansion – – – – 53 85 110 113 117 122 127 28.6%
Vetropack – – – – 678 705 729 752 777 803 830 3.5%
Total Revenue 955 1 011 988 1 035 1 806 1 898 1 975 2 026 2 080 2 135 2 192 15.4%






2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
The CAGR for total revenue is forecasted to be 15.4% . This percentage is however influenced 
by the acquisition of Vetropack. The organic growth CAGR of revenue was around 3.3%,
following the growth rates of the overall glass container packaging market. Although the 
market is projected to incur a 2.3% decline in 2020, it bounces back in following the years 
and returning to the similar growth rates presented before the pandemic
GDP growth (%) Urban Population (Millions)
The Price forecast was based on historical relationship identified between the evolution 
of prices in end-markets and the evolution of prices in glass containers. The premiumization 
trend identified in the market analysis was also considered
The Volume forecast for glass containers were calculated considering glass usage 
trends and with an optimization method on 2 coefficients which were multiplied by an 
Eco-friendly trend identified in the market analysis were also considered
Glass ContainersEnd- markets
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Additional Considerations | Business Plan | Financials Forecast : EBITDA – PLAN B





in Million € 2018H 2019H 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F 2026F 2027F 2028F CAGR*
Gross Profit 652 703 680 718 1 361 1 438 1 513 1 561 1 609 1 658 1 709 18.1%
Vidrala 652 703 680 718 752 784 813 839 862 885 909 4.3%
Add-ons – – – – 608 654 700 722 747 773 800 5.9%
Employee 
Benefit (191) (198) (199) (207) (379) (386) (392) (399) (407) (415) (423) 14.9%
Vidrala (191) (198) (199) (207) (212) (216) (220) (224) (228) (233) (238) 2.4%
Add-ons – – – – (167) (170) (173) (175) (178) (182) (185) 1.7%
Other Expenses (222) (231) (222) (231) (519) (541) (560) (574) (590) (606) (622) 20.9%
Vidrala (222) (231) (222) (231) (239) (245) (251) (256) (261) (265) (270) 2.9%
Add-ons – – – – (281) (296) (309) (319) (329) (340) (352) 4.3%
Organic EBITDA 239 275 264 280 301 323 343 359 373 386 400 6.4%
Add-ons EBITDA – – – – 161 188 218 229 240 251 263 12.4%
Total EBITDA 239 275 264 280 462 511 561 587 613 638 663 17.4%
Margin 25.1% 27.2% 26.7% 27% 25.6% 26.9% 28.4% 29.0% 29.5% 29.9% 30.3%
The largest caption in the Employee Benefit 
expense is the Salary and Wages. All captions 
depend on the number of employees and a 
defined value per employee. Regarding the 
number of employees, the driver is the revenue 
per employee, expected to keep increasing. This is 
because there is an expectancy that Vidrala’s
technological improvement increases automation. 
For Vetropack, revenue per employee is expected 
to slowly increase at a 3.5% yoy rate. (Same 
assumption as with Zignago’s) 1
2
3
For Vidrala, other expenses are mainly composed 
by sales expenses, electricity and external services 
(rents, insurance, etc.). Sales expenses and 
electricity are calculated as a function of sales. The 
ratio with sales is assumed to be the same as in 
2019. For Vetropack, the caption is modelled to be 
a percentage of sales (same ratio as 2019). 
However, more than é 60M are recorded as 
“Other administrative and operating expenses” –
which should be analyzed further if plan B is 
pursued
Organic EBITDA is expected to grow at a 6.4% 
CAGR, while with the Add-ons contributions is 
expected to grow at 12.4% CAGR
Comparing to plan A, the EBITDA margin does not 
increase as much, however, organic EBITDA 
increases more
At the exit year the EBITDA margin of the whole 
group is modeled to be at 29% (2.3pp less than Plan 
A)
However, due to the operating model assumptions, 
this value is expected to increase until 30.3% in 2028
From 2020 to 2025 EBITDA more than doubles 
Organic EBITDA is expected to grow at a 6.4% yoy
rate At exit this value is 359M
It is predicted an increase in gross profit that has a 
significant overall impact in total EBITDA growth in 
the investment period – even higher than plan A’s 











Additional Considerations | Business Plan | Financials Forecast : Free Cash Flow – PLAN B
in Million € 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 CAGR*
Total EBITDA 239 275 264 280 462 511 561 587 613 638 663 17.4%
Amortization & 
depreciation
(88) (91) (90) (92) (178) (179) (180) (181) (182) (183) (184) 15.0%
Vidrala (88) (91) (90) (92) (94) (95) (96) (97) (98) (99) (100) 1,5%
Add-ons – – – – (84) (84) (84) (84) (84) (84) (84) 0.0%
Impairments (4) (6) – – – – – – – – –
EBIT 147 178 174 188 285 332 381 407 431 455 479 18.5%
EBIT Margin (%) 15.4% 17.6% 17.6% 18.2% 15.8% 17.5% 19.3% 20.1% 20.7% 21.3% 21.9%
Income tax (Adj.) (32) (39) (40) (43) (66) (76) (88) (94) (99) (105) (110) 18.5%
Changes in NWC (28) (17) 8 (9) (25) (13) (10) (3) (3) (4) (4)
OCF 180 219 231 227 372 421 463 491 510 529 549 16.2%
CAPEX (102) (107) (118) (255) (193) (194) (195) (196) (198) (199) (200) 10.7%
Free Cash Flow 
(excl.acquisitions &cash)
78 112 113 (27) 179 227 268 294 312 331 349 21.0%
Free Cash Flow
(inc. acquisition)





Depreciation is assumed to be kept constant as a 
percentage of gross Property plant and equipment 
(except work in progress). In 2022, it increases 
steeply after starting the greenfield development 
and Vetropack's acquisition takes place
1
Impairments are a non-recurring expense and thus 
assumed to be zero in the future
3
Although Vidrala’s effective tax rate was 21.7% in 
2019, considering Spain’s tax rate of 25% and the 
fact that other countries where Vidrala will 
operate have lower corporate tax rates, the 
chosen tax rate was 23%
4
5
The graph on the right, shows the composition of 
NPP&E and CAPEX excluding the investment in the 
acquisition. Expansion capex is used in 2020 and 2021 
to invest in 2 new furnaces in Ireland’s facilities          
(€ 28M in each year) and to build the new plant in 
Romania (€ 135M). Between 2022 and 2028 there is 
just maintenance capex, including the investment 
made to improve operations, which adds 16% above 
Vidrala’s depreciation
As a result of COVID-19, NWC decreases by 3.8% in 
2020 and increases sharply in 2022 due to the 
acquisition of Vetropack and the operations in 
Romania. However, for the remaining years it 
increases at a lower rate. This is mainly explained by 
lower days in inventories (a reduction of 1.7% per 
year) achieved through synergies, automation and 
improving management systems
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2019H 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F
NPP&E and CAPEX 
(in million €)
Vidrala NPP&E Vetropack NPP&E CAPEX Vidrala Capex Vetropack
199 192 201
387 400 410 413
4171
2019H 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F 2026F
Net Working Capital evolution
(in million €)
With EBITDA growth, decreasing changes in NWC and  
constant levels of CAPEX, the FCF grows at a CAGR of 19.5%
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Additional Considerations | Business Plan | Financials Forecast : EBITDA bridge – Plan B
Vidrala’s Ebitda Organic Growth Accquisitions Exit EBITDAEntry EBITDA
• The greenfield development is expected to be working at full capacity by 
2025 and to contribute with an EBITDA of around € 51M. Assuming the 
project goes according to projections, it accounts for around 16% of the 
difference in EBITDA between 202o and 2025
• The acquisition of Vetropack is the the main driver of EBITDA growth. Not 
only does the company contribute with an EBITDA of € 177.5M by 2025, but 
it also adds an extra value of € 4.4M, since it causes an uplift in the Gross 
Margin of Vidrala´s existing facilities and consequently of EBITDA
From 2020 to 2025, EBITDA grows at a CAGR of 17% reaching € 587M. The EBITDA margin improves 2.3 percentage points from 26.7% in 2020 to 29% in 2025. Regarding 
absolute values, the exit EBITDA in 2025 is 2.22x the EBITDA in 2020. The main drivers of the expected increase are the acquisition Vetropack, while the other 
determinants were almost equally important
• The € 46.3M increase in EBITDA that comes from market growth is very 
significant. With rising consumption trends towards the use of glass, 
Vidrala’s current markets are expected to grow at a CAGR of 3% between 
2020 and 2025, contributing for almost 14% of the EBITDA difference
• Operational improvements also play an important role (€ 43.7M). The focus 
will be continuing to leverage Vidrala’s high level of automation, as 
expenses with personnel are one of the main costs, and betting on the use 
of more cullet to reduce energy and material consumption by a 2% minimum
Greenfield
Acquisition of Vetropack is the main driving force for the increase in EBITDA 
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Additional Considerations | Business Plan | Operational Improvements from Capex
1
3
Notes: UK & Ireland + Iberia only. COGS as % of revenue
in Million € 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028
Revenue 998 1 045 1 085 1 119 1 148 1 173 1 197 1 222 1 247
With modeled improvements
COGS* (305) (313) (319) (322) (324) (324) (328) (331) (335)
Employees Expense (199) (207) (212) (216) (220) (224) (228) (233) (238)
Conservative
COGS (305) (319) (332) (323) (331) (339) (346) (353) (360)
Employees Expense (199) (208) (219) (230) (239) (249) (259) (270) (281)
Savings COGS 6 13 1 8 14 18 22 25
Savings Employees 1 7 13 20 25 30 36 42
Capex for these 
improvements
(28) (28) (15) (15) (15) (16) (16) (16) (16)




in Million € 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028
With modeled improvements
Revenue per employee 
model - Vidrala
265 270 277 285 293 299 304 310 316
COGS Iberia** 31.4% 30.4% 29.9% 29.4% 28.9% 28.4% 28.4% 28.4% 28.4%
COGS UK & Ireland 34.5% 34.5% 33.6% 32.8% 31.9% 31.1% 30.4% 29.6% 28.9%
Conservative
Revenue per employee 
(2019) - Vidrala
265 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268
COGS Iberia 31.4% 31.4% 31.4% 30.0% 30.0% 30.0% 30.0% 30.0% 30.0%














It is modeled that some operational improvements 
are the direct result of capex expenditures. In 
addition to the maintenance capex, assumed to be 
equal to depreciation, there are other capex types 
such as: operational and expansion. The 
operational capex is the average percentage 
historical maintenance capex which is higher than 
depreciation that has been increasing automation. 
The expansion capex refers to the two furnaces 
that Vidrala currently has projected to UK & 
Ireland
These COGS and Employees Expense are the ones 
assumed in the operating model. First in the latest 
years, there has been a significant decrease in the 
revenue per employee ratio which could be 
attained with such CAPEX and following the 
R&D&I projects that Vidrala already participates in. 
Secondly, the furnaces upgrades in Ireland and the 
ones that Vidrala has been making in Iberia are 
assumed to be kept (by spending more capex than 
depreciation)
In order to control if such assumptions are being 
too optimistic/pessimistic a cost/benefit analysis 
was performed. By keeping the revenue per 
employee levels of 2019 constant from 2021 
onwards (2020 not included since it is assumed 
that due to Covid-19 the number of employees 
would not decrease) and by assuming a more 
conservative trend in COGS as % of revenue, a net 
benefit was obtained. Note that these would just 
be the direct impacts, given that, networking 
capital would be slightly affected by the decrease 
in COGS
Capex above depreciation is modelled to create medium 




Entry debt will account for 66% of the capital structure, representing 5.12x the EBITDA for 
both firms
Additional Considerations | Capital Structure | Sources and Uses 
Debt In million € EBITDA Vidrala x % of Total
Vidrala
Senior debt
Term Loan A 263.6 1x 9.9%
Term Loan B 527.1 2x 19.7%
Term Loan C 263.6 1x 9.9%
Subordinated debt
Mezzanine 263.6 1x 9.9%
Zignago Vetro In million € EBITDA Zignago x % of Total
Senior debt
Term Loan D 158.8 2x 5.9%
Term Loan E 277.9 3.5x 10.4%
Total debt 1 754.6 65.7%
Sources of Funds
Enterprise Value In million € % of Total EV
Vidrala
EBITDA 2020 263.6 
Multiple 7.5x
Enterprise Value 1 987
Total debt 363.7
Cash 130.2
Net Debt 233.5 





Total EBITDA 342.9 
Total EV 2 585.6
Fees
Due Diligence Fees 25.9 1.0%
Advisory Fees 25.9 1.0%
Banking Fees 35 1.36%
Total Fees 86.8 3.36%
TOTAL USES 2 672.4
Equity In million € EBITDA Vidrala x % of Total
Vidrala
Fixed Return Instrument 692.7 2.63x 25.9%
Ordinary Equity 63.2 0.2x 2.4%
Institutional Investor 56.9 2.1%
Sweet Equity 6.3 
Zignago Vetro In million € EBITDA Zignago x % of Total
Fixed Return Instrument 
Zignago 161.9 2.04x 6.1%
Total Equity 917.7 34.3%
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